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Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Fiscal Consolidation: 
How Harmful is Austerity? 
    Abstract  
Departing from the expansionary austerity literature, this study assesses empirically whether fiscal 
consolidation propagates changes in the supply side of the economy that can potentially influence total 
factor productivity (TFP). Using a panel dataset of 26 OECD countries over the period 1980-2016 and 
employing panel vector autoregressive and panel cointegration techniques, we present evidence of both 
short-run and long-run negative effects of fiscal consolidation on TFP. The short-run impact is 
disproportionately more damaging for the TFP of low debt countries, while, contrary to the 
expansionary austerity thesis, our empirical results would advise against spending-driven fiscal 
consolidation, since such consolidation undermines capacity, due to the importance of government 
spending in shaping productive capital. Our results have serious policy implications for the 
implementation and design of fiscal adjustment programmes. 
JEL Classification: E62, C23, H68 
Keywords: total factor productivity, fiscal consolidation, OECD countries, austerity, growth 
‘Efficient public spending can increase productivity through, for example, improving education systems 
or public investment in key infrastructures’ Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Speech at the Academy of 
Athens, 1/10/2019 
‘Despite the long-term benefits of increasing the share of productive public expenditure, after the Great 
Recession most Member States implemented fiscal adjustment plans that hit disproportionally productive 
investment’, European Fiscal Board, 2019 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The effect of fiscal consolidation on output and other macroeconomic fundamentals such as, 
consumption, investment and employment has been the main focus of the existing austerity 
literature. The focus is mainly on the demand side effects of austerity with inconclusive 
empirical findings. Intuitively, the debate is focused on whether austerity in the form of fiscal 
consolidation is expansionary, contractionary or neutral with reference to output. Early 
contributions from Blanchard (1990); Bertola and Drazen (1993); Sutherland (1997); Alesina 
et al (2002); Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1995); Ardagna (2004); Alesina and Perotti (1997) 
support empirically the existence of expansionary austerity effects. The thesis of expansionary 
fiscal contraction received renewed support in the period following the 2007/8 financial crisis 
(Alesina and Ardagna, 2010), in an effort to reconcile fiscal consolidation efforts with growth 
and demand concerns. The main argument is that fiscal contraction stimulates growth -contrary 
to conventional Keynesian wisdom- through credibility channels (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990). 
Accordingly, an increase in tax today works in a precautionary fashion eliminating the need of 
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larger increases in the future.  Both consumers and investors perceive this as a policy signal for 
tax cuts in the future, so they form expectations for higher disposable income, thus higher 
consumption and investment. 
A crucial aspect of the growth-austerity nexus yet attracting no attention is whether 
austerity propagates changes in the supply side of the economy that can potentially influence 
the growth rate of productivity. In other words, our knowledge is limited as to whether 
austerity programmes undermine the economy’s productive capacity through underinvestment 
in neuralgic sectors such as infrastructure, technology and innovation.1 If this concern is valid 
then adverse effects are likely to spread affecting the evolution of aggregate productivity in the 
long-run. At the moment, the expansionary austerity literature tells us very little about whether 
fiscal consolidation impairs or enhances measures of technical progress such as: Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP). TFP is highly informative about the supply-status of the economy in 
measures such as technological advancement, competitiveness and export performance but it 
also embodies substantial welfare implications (Delgado et al., 2012). Drivers of TFP are -
among others- investment in public infrastructure, education and research and development 
(R&D), which are mainly publicly funded sectors that shape the productive capacity of the 
national economy. Understanding the dynamics of the fiscal consolidation-TFP nexus becomes 
increasingly important in association with recent evidence (Fernald et al., 2017) that 
documents a substantial slowdown in TFP, especially in the post 2009 period. Another 
important policy perspective of our research question is related to the remarkable deceleration 
of TFP in the euro-area, where virtually no single economy has exhibited a positive growth rate 
of TFP since the global financial crisis of 2008 (Van Ark, 2014). At the same time, there is 
evidence that the share of productive expenditure in total primary public expenditure, which 
includes infrastructure, R&D and education, has dropped in nearly all euro-area economies 
since the crisis (European Fiscal Board, 2019). Is the evidence on decelerating TFP compatible 
with the expansionary fiscal contraction thesis, which has anchored the politics of the austerity 
debate and offered the intellectual rationale for pursuing harsh fiscal consolidation in a number 
of advanced countries? To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first one that 
seeks to address this question analyzing both the short and long-run effects, of austerity on 
productivity.  
The paper employs evidence from a sample of 26 OECD countries over the period 
1980-2016 to explore the linkages between fiscal consolidation and TFP. The conventional 
                                                 
1 Stiglitz (2015) in a similar line of reasoning argues that the decline in GDP during the crisis that can be 
accounted for by declines in physical and human capital falls short of the actual decline in GDP, therefore 
suggesting that there is a missing “dark matter” related to the effects of the prolonged crisis and austerity policies.  
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approach to identify austerity and more broadly discretionary fiscal policy adjustments is 
through changes in the Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB). Alternatively, we 
employ a “narrative approach” that consults a wide range of contemporaneous policy 
documents that announce government fiscal actions (Devries et al., 2011). The appealing 
characteristic of the “narrative approach” is that the measure of fiscal consolidation is regarded 
as strictly exogenous2 and it can be decomposed into spending cuts and tax hikes. The main 
drawback of the “narrative approach” is that the time period covered is shorter and the number 
of countries is smaller.3 
We start the analysis with a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) econometric 
specification, which is commonly used in the expansionary austerity literature in identifying 
the evolution of TFP after episodes of fiscal consolidation. The VAR approach helps us to 
understand the short-run reaction of TFP after fiscal consolidation episodes. Next, to 
understand how fiscal adjustments drive TFP in the long-run, we use panel cointegration 
techniques. Furthermore, one needs to acknowledge that productivity enhancing and (or) 
productivity repressing effects from austerity might be both present in the sample impacting 
differently on countries with different structural features. 
 One of the most crucial features that can justify a beneficial use of austerity policy is 
public debt sustainability. Governments are likely to be proactive when encountering debt 
sustainability concerns, so any decision for contractionary fiscal action might bring 
productivity gains when the ratio of debt to GDP exceeds a certain threshold. To capture the 
existence of such effects, we replicate separately estimations for groups of countries with 
different levels of debt burden. Finally, with the use of the “narrative approach” we decompose 
fiscal consolidation into spending cuts and tax hikes to identify whether TFP responds 
differently between the two components of fiscal consolidation.   
The paper implements a series of robustness tests in the definition of key variables and 
estimation techniques. Our findings reveal that austerity in the form of fiscal consolidation 
impacts negatively in productivity both in the short and long-run. The negative effect is not 
driven by the method used to measure fiscal consolidation and productivity. Regarding the 
long-run effects of austerity on TFP, we have used a number of different econometric 
estimators and in all the estimated coefficient of fiscal consolidation is negative. The paper is 
                                                 
2 For recent studies on the problem of endogeneity of fiscal consolidation decisions, see De Cos and Moral-Benito 
(2013 and 2016), Guajardo et al (2014), Yang et al (2015) and Breuer (2017). 
3 Historical narrative data was previously used in the expansionary austerity literature (Guajardo et al., 2014; 
Jordà and Taylor, 2016). These studies indicate that fiscal consolidation contracts private consumption and GDP 
growth. The magnitude of this effect is around to 0.75 and 0.65 percentage point losses after a one percent 
increase in fiscal consolidation. 
4 
 
structured as follows: section 2 is taking as a starting point the key theoretical arguments 
discussed in the agenda of the expansionary austerity literature, and puts forward additional 
factors that could affect the fiscal adjustment-productivity nexus. Section 3, first presents 
empirical results from the response of TFP to fiscal consolidation episodes using a PVAR 
framework. This part also identifies whether the pattern of the TFP-fiscal consolidation 
relationship varies with the level of public debt; then, panel cointegration techniques are 
employed to treat more systematically the short- and long-run dynamics of the fiscal 
adjustment-TFP nexus. Finally, as a further refinement, panel cointegration is applied to 
distinguish between taxes and expenditure effects on TFP.  Section 3, also presents and 
discusses results from several sensitivity checks. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Productivity and Fiscal Adjustments: Some Theoretical Considerations  
 
The neoclassical thesis states that a sound fiscal policy is vital in achieving stable 
macroeconomic conditions that promote growth and prosperity (Daniel, 2006). This argument 
is further investigated in the expansionary austerity literature, which links cuts in government 
spending to structural reforms aimed at improving public sector efficiency (European 
Commission, 2007). Alesina and Ardagna (2010) find that a one percentage point higher 
government spending to GDP leads to a 0.75 percentage point lower growth.4 On the basis of 
the neoclassical proposition, fiscal loosening can cause adverse effects on productivity mainly 
via two channels: (i) crowding out private investment and (ii) triggering uncertainty. 5 
Continuous loosening of the fiscal stance not only leads to higher interest rates, but also 
discourages business and entrepreneurial activities, as the government usually focuses on 
unproductive spending that has limited scope for generating substantial growth returns in the 
long-run (Furceri and Sousa, 2011). Fiscal imbalances are commonly identified (Ardagna, 
2004) in economies that fail to attract the appropriate level of private investment, which 
potentially leads to low levels of capital deepening and output per worker. The second channel 
                                                 
4 Other evidence of expansionary austerity effects is found in Ardagna (2004) whereby a reduction of the primary 
spending to GDP ratio by one percentage point increases GDP growth by 0.5 percentage point. Romer and Romer 
(2010) show that increases in tax revenue are effective in reducing budget deficit without causing significant 
output losses.  
5 Other stimulative channels identified in the expansionary austerity scenario include credibility gains and lower 
inflation risks. There might also be gains in the labour market through cuts in public employment that stimulate 
wages and jobs in the private sector. A more detailed discussion for fiscal adjustment associated gains can be 
found in Daniel (2006). More recently, it has also been argued that the predictability of fiscal policy matters for 
the size of crowding out effects (Cavallari and Romano, 2017).  
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mainly focuses on the uncertainty induced in the economy due to continuous loosening in the 
budgetary balance. The main source of uncertainty is how and when this unsustainable 
condition will be fixed to avoid debt unsustainability problems. In other words, the policy 
objective that concerns primarily investors is whether fiscal consolidation will be implemented 
via spending cuts or higher average tax rates. The latter case is widely regarded as a source of 
volatility and risk, which again turns into a disincentive for private investment. An unstable 
fiscal environment might affect the type and quality of investment, as investors prefer 
investment projects with short-term returns to long-term investment engagement, while it is the 
latter the one that typically provides more productivity benefits for the economy.  
On the other hand, the productivity of government spending is an important aspect of 
the puzzle when the effectiveness of fiscal policy is assessed. A major component of 
government spending in advanced economies is on developing and maintaining infrastructure 
which drives output in the private sector.6 Causality is found to run from public capital to 
aggregate productivity, which can be taken as evidence that inadequate public investment 
accounts for productivity slowdowns. Stagnation in the level of per capita income in advanced 
economies is usually attributed to factors related to insufficient public investment in sectors 
such as transport and energy (Bloom et al., 2013). The logic is straightforward; sectors with 
substantial scope to generate productivity spillovers are usually funded under public schemes. 
Therefore, underinvestment in periods of fiscal consolidation triggers negative consequences 
in other downstream sectors, which results in an overall productivity slowdown.  Fernald 
(1999) ratifies this argument for roads building and economic growth in the US, while Roller 
and Waverman (2001) find a similar effect for telecommunication infrastructure in a sample of 
OECD countries. The elasticity of private output to changes in public investment varies across 
countries but it tends to be high even in cases of public investment in semi-productive 
activities (Leeper et al. 2010).7 
More recently Rodrik (2016) casts doubt on another milestone underlying the 
expansionary austerity hypothesis: structural reforms. Austerity programmes are often 
accompanied with an ambitious structural reform agenda of a "big bang" type - do as many 
changes as possible, as quickly as possible. Such pro-market reforms include, for instance, 
deregulation of labour market (breaking union monopoly power), and removal of barriers to 
entry and privatization of state assets. Although the overarching goal is to reallocate factors 
                                                 
6 See Bom and Ligthart (2014) for a detailed meta-analysis on the productivity of public capital. 
7 Recent literature (Aghion et al., 2010 and 2014) point out that, in the presence of credit constraints, even cyclical 
fiscal adjustments can generate long run impacts through substitution of long-term productivity-enhancing 
investment for less productive short-term investment. 
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towards more productive sectors, any serious assessment of the actual results from structural 
reforms and their impact on aggregate productivity indicates much less optimism (Rodrik, 
2016). A bold economy-wide liberalization programme as a complement of austerity might 
actually drive resources towards unproductive (low value added) sectors and the outcome 
achieved can be quite the opposite than a boost of aggregate productivity.8  
On the whole, the fiscal adjustment-growth nexus still remains fragile without robust 
findings on any stand. The existing literature neglects the effect of austerity on productivity, 
while there are reasons to argue that tightening fiscal policy could also lead to undesired 
effects. The expansionary austerity literature so far remains silent on the nature of the 
austerity-productivity relationship, which can have both short-and long-run aspects. The main 
contribution of our paper is to fill in this gap. At the same time, our analysis also improves our 
understanding of the recently highly topical policy debate on whether austerity could be self-
defeating. The design and pace of warranted fiscal consolidation has become an issue of 
controversy with several authors arguing that reductions in deficits have ended up delivering 
higher debt-to-GDP ratios thus, accelerating the effects of the negative debt-growth spiral 
(Ersoy and Yanmaz, 2016; Heimberger, 2017; House et al., 2017; Fatás and Summers, 2018). 
Although the debt-to-GDP ratio is not of primary concern in the present paper, exploring the 
effects of austerity on TFP certainly provides a plausible line of reasoning one can put forward 
within a broader fiscal sustainability perspective.  
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy  
3.1 Data Description 
We gather data from 26 OECD countries over the period 1980-2016. We follow Blanchard 
(1993) in defining fiscal consolidation as large observed improvements in the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance (CAPB). CAPB is intended to capture discretionary fiscal policy by 
excluding the estimated effects of business cycle fluctuations on the government budget. 
Therefore, taxes and transfers are cyclically adjusted with net interest payments also to be 
subtracted. CAPB is a discretionary measure of fiscal policy as it excludes interest payments 
from past government liabilities on accumulated debt. Changes in the CAPB (dcapb) can then 
be used to identify large-scale fiscal adjustments, known as fiscal consolidation episodes 
                                                 
8 Unless structural reforms are carefully planned as a targeted, selective removal of key obstacles impeding 
growth, this policy can eventually backlash even in the long run. 
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(FCΕ). An alternative approach to CAPB is to identify fiscal adjustments endogenously (Wiese 
et al., 2018). Despite the merits of this approach, its use in our context can be problematic as it 
applies an “one size fits all” criterion of fiscal adjustments, while it does not identify the end of 
fiscal adjustment.9 Instead, we use two alternative measures of CAPB, namely CAPBO and 
CAPBE for robustness. The superscript O refers to our own calculations for the derivation of 
CAPB, broadly in harmony with the European Commission methodology and E refers to the 
CAPB measure directly taken from the OECD Economic Outlook series (for details see 
Appendix D). For the purposes of the descriptive analysis, we present results only from 
CAPBE, while in the econometric specification section 3.3, we test both variables to ensure 
that results are not driven from methodological differences in the definition of the variable.10  
Figure 1 shows changes in CAPB over time for a sub-sample of the 26 OECD 
countries. The countries shown in the graphs are those conveying information about events that 
are accompanied with substantial variations in dcapb. For the group of countries not shown in 
Figure 1, dcapb movements are smoother over time. Germany and the Netherlands implement 
substantial fiscal tightening in mid-1990s. Fiscal expansion after German re-unification in 
1991 was followed by a severe programme of fiscal adjustment. Spain implemented a tight 
fiscal policy after 2009 while Italy did likewise at a smaller intensity. A similar pattern of fiscal 
loosening just before 2009 is observed in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Iceland with severe 
fiscal tightening to follow in the upcoming years. The latter four countries implemented severe 
austerity in early 2010s in exchange of a bailout programme for maintaining external debt 
sustainability. A common feature of bailout programmes is a rapid and front-loaded fiscal 
adjustment as it becomes clear in those graphs. There is a fiscal loosening in UK and USA in 
early 2000s and fiscal tightening in the aftermath of the 2008-9 financial-banking crisis with 
bailout programmes for rescuing the financial system in these countries. With the exception of 
Norway and Sweden, the timing of fiscal consolidation in the post 2009 period is a common 
feature for all countries in Figure 1 - including New Zealand and to a lesser extent Australia. 
The intensity of fiscal adjustment was stronger in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain that 
encounter issues with debt sustainability and severe international borrowing constraints. 
  
                                                 
9 See Kleis and Moessinger (2016) and Amo-Yartey et al. (2012) for an overview of the criteria used to define 
fiscal consolidation episodes (FCE). In the alternative approach of endogenously identified fiscal adjustments 
(Wiese at al., 2018) the latter continues as long as the change in CAPB is positive, which seems an arbitrary 
choice. In addition, the methodology used in Wiese et al. (2018) does not subtract interest payments accepting as 
part of CAPB an expenditure that is well outside the control of the government. An endogenous identification of 
fiscal adjustment also requires a large number of observations per country that are not available even for many 
OECD countries, which makes it even more restrictive in our case. 
10 The degree of correlation between the two alternatives definitions of CAPB is in the order of 0.65.  
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Figure 1: Change in Cyclical Adjusted Primary Balance (dcapb), for Selected OECD Countries 
1981-2016 
Notes: Numbers on the y-axis represent changes in CAPB as shares to GDP. The higher the share the 
higher the level of fiscal tightening. The shares can also be negative as the level of fiscal loosening 
increases.  
 
 
3.2 Results from a Panel Vector Auto-regression (PVAR) Model 
 
We first specify a Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) model to address the short-run 
dynamics of the bi-variate relationship between fiscal consolidation episodes and TFP. The 
PVAR model explores the dynamic relationship between fiscal policy shocks and reaction of 
TFP growth using Impulse–Response Functions (IRF). The IRF describes the reaction of one 
variable to the innovations of another variable while all other forces of the system are held 
constant. We prefer using PVAR estimations to generate IRFs to the alternative of local 
projections (Banerjee and Zampolli, 2019) as the latter methodology tends to display more bias 
as well as higher variance, resulting in less accurate confidence intervals for the IRFs (Jordà, 
2005; Kilian and Kim, 2009). The PVAR is specified as follows: 
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where [ , ]it it itz FCE tfp= ∆  is a vector of endogenous variables, Δtfp is the difference in logs of 
Total Factor Productivity (growth rates), FCE is fiscal consolidation episodes, B is a 2×2 
coefficient matrix and itυ  is 2×1 error term. Index h gives the order of lags in the PVAR. 
Subscripts i and t denote countries and years, respectively. The length of the PVAR is specified 
at two lags as indicated from the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Appendix B1). Fiscal 
consolidation episodes (FCΕ) are defined under the CAPBE in three ways to capture different 
intensities in the implementation of fiscal consolidation attempts, while the TFP measurement 
is described in Appendix A1. At the end of this section, we replicate results considering a 
measure of labour productivity (output per hours works, OECD, 2018) (LP), which is less 
informative than TFP though more straightforward in calculations and less sensitive to 
measurement bias. 
We prefer specifying a parsimonious two variables PVAR following Bachmann et al. 
(2013) as it is easier to identify. The cost of this choice is an omitted variable problem that we 
partially address in panel cointegration estimation in the next section. Although, the focus of 
the current analysis is to unveil how TFP responds to a FCE, we are far from claiming that 
fiscal realisations are potentially the only drivers of TFP in the short run. For instance, Cette et 
al. (2016) in a similar line of argument with ours, show that lower real interest rates are 
responsible for productivity slowdown in a small group of developed economies. This scenario 
might be also present in our data, nevertheless estimating a higher dimensionality PVAR will 
further challenge the identification strategy without adding many insights in the key question 
under investigation.  
In formulating (1), we specify term iγ  (fixed effects) to account for individual country 
heterogeneity in the panel structure of the data. Fixed effects estimators are inconsistent in the 
presence of endogeneity therefore, GMM is applied to estimate (1) using as instruments lagged 
values of endogenous variables as per Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). To rule out the bias between 
fixed effects and lagged values of endogenous regressors, we take first-differences. We apply 
the forward mean differentiating method, which removes for each country only the forward 
means of all available future observations (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Since past realizations 
are not included in the first differencing transformation, lagged values of the untransformed 
level variables can still be used as instruments for the transformed endogenous variables in 
GMM. The resulting estimate of B is then used to construct the IRFs. Estimates are specified 
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within 95% confidence intervals with bootstrapped standard errors drawn after 200 iterations 
(Lof and Malinen, 2014).   
 To identify the system, we use the recursive VAR structure (Hamilton, 1994) in which 
the order of endogenous variables matters. In our set-up, we use the convention that there is a 
delay between political action and actual spending (Caldara and Kamps, 2008; Lof et al., 
2015). This is to say that current shocks in Δtfp have an effect on current fiscal policy, while 
fiscal policy actions impact on Δtfp with a lag. Intuitively, this assumption is plausible as 
government budget is determined once a year, so any decisions that impact on economic 
activities will take effect in the forthcoming year while it is common to assume that a 
government usually responds instantaneously to a productivity shock. We test empirically the 
above assumption applying the panel Granger causality test of Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) 
on whether TFP can Granger-cause changes in CAPB. We follow the estimation routine of 
Lopez and Weber (2017) in selecting the optimal number of lags of the model. Under the null 
hypothesis there is no Granger causality for any units in the panel with the average statistic 
associated with the null hypothesis to be distributed independently and identically in infinite 
samples. Appendix B2 shows the estimates from the Granger causality test, accordingly, we 
were not able to reject the null hypothesis that TFP does not Granger-cause CAPB for two 
alternative measures of the latter variable. Therefore, for our identification strategy in the 
PVAR estimation, we have sufficient evidence to argue that fiscal consolidation episodes 
(FCE) should be placed before Δtfp. 
Turning to the measure of FCE, all three definitions represent large consolidation 
attempts. FCE1 and FCE2 refer to cumulative effects over a number of years while FCE3 
identifies improvements in a single year and it is widely regarded as an episode of severe 
austerity (Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). Precisely, FCE1 takes the 
value one if country i has achieved cumulatively a dcapb>1% for two consecutive years with 
at least 0.5% in the first year and zero otherwise, (Ahrend et al., 2006); FCE2 takes the value 
one if country i has achieved cumulatively a dcapb>1.5% for three years with a dcapb no less 
than 0.5% for any of the years and zero otherwise (European Commission, 2007 and Barrios et 
al., 2010); FCE3 takes the value one if country i has achieved a dcapb >1.5 in year t and zero 
otherwise (Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010; de Cos and Moral-Benito, 
2013). Appendix D2 displays the years of fiscal consolidation episodes for each country using 
definition FCE3.   
PVAR results are presented in the form of IRFs that show the impact of a fiscal 
consolidation episode on the evolution of current TFP growth for a period of five years after 
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the realisation of the episode. Figure 2 displays three IRFs, one for each definition of FCE. 
These estimates suggest a negative impact of fiscal consolidation on TFP with the effect to last 
from one to two years depending on the definition considered. For FCE1, the impact of the 
episode is significant for one year while it dies afterwards. The size of this effect is 0.8 percent. 
Given that Δtfp is differences in log TFP, the above coefficient can be interpreted as an episode 
of fiscal consolidation to decelerate the growth rate of TFP by 0.8 percent. When, fiscal 
consolidation is defined as dcapb>1.5 over a 3 years’ period, FCE2, the negative effect on Δtfp 
dies out again after one year and the decrease in TFP growth rate is equal to 0.48 percent. The 
strongest effect on TFP is found with FCE3, which is regarded as a measure of severe 
austerity. The duration of the effect in this case dies out after two years with TFP to be 
decreased cumulatively by 1 percent.  
Figure 2: Impulse Responses from PVAR with 2 Lags of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes and Δtfp -Full 
Sample 
 
Notes: The impulse response functions IRF (dashed line) are derived from a PVAR (2) with h=2 and shows the 
change in Δtfp five years after a fiscal consolidation episode (FCE). FCE1 takes the value 1 if country i has 
achieved dcapb>1% cumulatively for two consecutive years and zero otherwise; FCE2 takes the value 1 if 
country i has achieved dcapb>1.5% cumulatively for three consecutive years and zero otherwise; FCE3 takes the 
value 1 if country i has achieved dcapb>1.5% in a single year and zero otherwise. 
 
Overall, Impulse-Response diagrams show that the negative shock of a fiscal consolidation 
episode on TFP can be persistent up to two years in cases of severe austerity. Quantitatively, 
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the negative effect of FCE on TFP is smaller than estimates found in Guajardo et al. (2014) 
and Jordà and Taylor (2016) for the effect of austerity on an array of domestic demand 
variables. Replicating the same PVAR specification for LP, we observe that the response of LP 
to a negative impulse from FCE1 and FCE2 now lasts two years with the deceleration in LP 
not exceeding 0.1 percent. In the case of a severe austerity as per FCE3 definition, the effect 
lasts up to three years. Overall, evidence in Figures 2 and 3 confirm the existence of 
contractionary short-run effects of austerity in both productivity measures. Differences in the 
responses between TFP and LP exist mainly in the duration of the effect and to a lesser extent 
in the strength of it. The detrimental effects of austerity on LP seem to last at least for two 
years with the economy reverting back to the pre-episode condition after three years while if 
TFP is considered the economy seems to recover slightly faster. We now proceed with 
analysing whether the short run effects of TFP after FCE varies across with different debt-to-
GDP profiles. The estimation of a cointegrating relationship in the next section will signify 
whether the tightening or loosening of fiscal policy can also induce substantial long-run effects 
on productivity.  
Figure 3: Impulse Responses from PVAR with 2 Lags of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes and Δlp -
Full Sample 
 
Notes: The impulse response functions IRF (dashed line) are derived from a PVAR(2) with h=2 and 
shows the change in Δlp five years after a fiscal consolidation episode (FCE). Definitions of FCE are 
identical to IRFs in Figure 2.  
-.002
-.001
0
.001
0 1 2 3 4 5
FCE1 to dlp
-.002
0
.002
0 1 2 3 4 5
FCE2 to dlp
-.02
-.01
0
.01
0 1 2 3 4 5
FCE3 to dlp
13 
 
 
3.2.1 PVAR Estimates for High Debt-Low Debt Countries 
 
In addition to the full sample analysis, we replicate PVARs estimates separately for high and 
low debt countries. The rationale behind this exercise is to unveil whether the benefits of 
productivity enhancing austerity are more relevant in countries with substantial burden of 
public debt. Productivity-enhancing austerity might be more effective when the country 
exceeds a critical threshold of debt and must call for fiscal adjustment in order to maintain a 
stable private business environment with low inflation and default risks. Corsetti et al. (2010) 
argue that prospective spending cuts stimulate anticipation of low inflation and in association 
with a zero bounded interest rate the economy can enhance private investment. Efforts to 
reduce the share of debt to GDP can also reduce future policy intervention for tax increases, 
which promote crowding-in effects alongside with an efficient use of resources that stimulate 
capital accumulation, thus a higher level of productivity (Dar and AmirKhalkhali, 2002).  
Analogously, austerity measures can harm disproportionately countries with low level of 
public debt, which can potentially cause adverse effects on the productive capacity of the 
economy. To explore how Δtfp responds to FCE in countries with different levels of debt, we 
split our sample into “High Debt” and “Low Debt” countries using as threshold the sample 
median of debt-to-GDP ratio (Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015).11 Appendix B3 shows average 
values of debt-to-GDP ratio.  
Graphs from IRFs and 5% error bands for the three alternative definitions of FCE are 
shown in Figure 4. The optimal number of lags for the PVAR associated with the IRFs is 
specified at two. Graphs in the upper panel of Figure 4 show no evidence for a significant 
impact of FCE on Δtfp for High debt countries. A fiscal consolidation episode does however 
affect Δtfp in low debt countries persistently regardless the definition of FCE. The negative 
effects from FCE die out after two years when FCE2 and FCE3 are used. The cumulative 
coefficient for all three different definitions of FCE is close to 0.8 for the group of low debt 
countries, which implies that the shock induced from a fiscal consolidation episode reduces 
TFP growth by 0.8 percent. These results suggest that the negative effects of fiscal 
consolidation tend to be stronger in countries with low debt ratios while the detrimental effect 
of austerity on productivity is non-existent in countries with high levels of debt. This finding 
                                                 
11 The sample median is 57%, very close to the 60% Maastricht rule for the Eurozone countries. Appendix B3 
displays the average value of debt-to-GDP ratio over the period 1980-2016 for all countries. Using the “canonical” 
rule of 90% debt-to-GDP ratio leaves us only with four countries in the “high debt” group, Belgium, Greece, Italy 
and Japan. With this small number of observations, the covariance matrix becomes singular, so it becomes 
infeasible to estimate a PVAR.  
14 
 
can be interpreted as evidence in favour of non-Keynesian effects of expansionary austerity, at 
least when debt to GDP is approximately above 60%. It is also true that the impact of austerity 
on TFP growth in the short-run is not always homogenous, rather depends on structural 
characteristics in each country such as debt profile (Afonso and Jalles, 2011).  
 
Figure 4: Impulse Responses from PVAR with 2 Lags of Fiscal Consolidation Episodes and Δtfp - 
High and Low Debt countries (Threshold 60.2%) 
 
Notes: The impulse response functions IRF (dashed line) are derived from a PVAR(2) with h=2 showing 
the change in Δtfp five years after a fiscal consolidation episode (FCE). Definitions of FCE are identical 
to IRFs in Figure 2.  
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3.3  Results from Estimating Panel Cointegration Models                                                                                                                             
3.3.1 Empirical Methodology 
Next, we employ panel cointegration methods to study the relationship between fiscal 
consolidation and TFP. We have chosen to use three techniques, the dynamic ordinary least 
squares (DOLS) estimator of Kao and Chiang (2000), the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator 
of Pesaran et al. (1999) and in order of completeness we also apply the common correlated 
effects (CCE) estimator of Pesaran (2006). The panel cointegration methodology addresses 
endogeneity and serial correlation problems that are present in ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimation. The DOLS and PMG estimators pool data across countries to obtain a unique stable 
long-run vector assuming homogeneity while the short-run dynamics are flexible and 
unrestricted across panel units (Demetriades and Law, 2006). 12  A long-run relationship is 
estimated taking into account the dynamic nature of the data: (i) distinguishing between long-
run and short-run behaviour (ii) using error-correction to estimate the speed of adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium relationship. In the CCE estimation we augment the model with 
cross-section averages of all variables and estimate with OLS. The following log-linear 
specification is considered: 
0it B it it ittfp uα α ′= + Λ + +Xx α      (2) 
where tfp is a measure of total factor productivity in country i at year t, and variable Λ stands 
for capb (cyclically adjustment primary balance). We use interchangeably two definitions, 
CAPBO (own estimations) and CAPBE (estimations obtained from OECD Economic Outlook 
(2018), Models 1a and 1b, respectively); x, is a vector of other covariates that drive tfp 
consistent with recent evidence (Mc Morrow et al., 2010; Bjørnskov and Méon, 2015). This 
vector includes R&D stock (RD), trade openness (openness) both measured as a share of GDP 
and interest rate of government bonds (i). α is a vector of parameters to be estimated.13  
 
3.3.2 Panel Unit Root and Panel Cointegration and Tests of Cross-Sectional Dependence 
Before estimating the cointegrating relationship, we test for the order of integration of the 
variables included in the long-run equation using the panel unit root tests LLC, Breitung and 
                                                 
12 See appendix C1 for a full representation of the DOLS specification. 
13 R&D stock is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. R&D investment data in 2010 USD refer to total 
Business R&D (BERD) and they are taken from OECD (Main Science and Technology Indicators). Trade 
openness is the ratio of imports and exports over GDP (OECD-Economic Outlook). Interest rate is the long-term 
interest on government bonds (OECD-Economic outlook). Appendix D1 displays a table of summary statistics.   
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IPS of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000) and Im et al. (2003).14 As shown in Table 
1, based on the three tests the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (otherwise the existence of a 
unit root) cannot be rejected uniformly regarding all the series. Accordingly, all variables in 
first differences reject the null of a unit root and become stationary I(0). Thus, the series 
examined are first-order integrated I(1).  
 
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests, 1980-2016 
Variables in Level 
         LLC                         Breitung                       IPS 
tfp 1.524 
(0.936) 
         -1.849 
          (0.032) 
 -0.358 
(0.360) 
CAPBO  -2.0244* 
(0.022) 
         -1.868 
          (0.031) 
 -5.310** 
(0.000) 
CAPBE -0.307 
 (0.379) 
           -4.147** 
          (0.000) 
 -4.047** 
(0.000) 
RD 0.894 
 (0.814) 
             3.973** 
           (1.000) 
 2.436* 
(0.993) 
i 2.3325* 
(0.990) 
          0.404 
          (0.656) 
 -0.722 
(0.235) 
openness 2.363* 
(0.991) 
         1.978*                            
            (0.976) 
   0.857 
  (0.804) 
Variables in First Differences 
tfp -13.97** 
(0.000) 
-9.635** 
(0.000) 
 -16.09** 
(0.000) 
CAPBO -3.700** 
(0.000) 
-8.492** 
(0.000) 
 13.277** 
(0.000) 
CAPBE -9.130** 
(0.000) 
-12.76** 
(0.000) 
 -19.06** 
(0.000) 
RD -4.842** 
(0.000) 
-6.845** 
(0.000) 
 -9.835** 
(0.000) 
i -9.101** 
(0.000) 
-11.17** 
(0.000) 
 -12.69** 
(0.000) 
openness --2.662** 
(0.004) 
-7.248** 
(0.000) 
 -10.734** 
(0.000) 
Note: LLC is Levin et al. (2002), Breitung is Breitung(2000) and IPS is Im et al. (2003). The tests reported use a 
constant term and a trend. All test statistics follow the normal distribution. ** and * denote the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 1 and 5 percent levels of significance, respectively. Numbers in parentheses 
are p-values. 
 
The recent panel-data literature places emphasis on the substantial cross-sectional 
dependence in the errors that panel data may exhibit, which may arise because of the presence 
                                                 
14 The IPS test estimates a separate ADF regression for each individual cross-section to allow for separate unit 
root processes assuming heterogeneous cross-sections (the known between dimension), while the Breitung test is 
a panel version of an Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) considering homogeneity in the coefficient of the 
variables in levels but allowing the lag order for the first differenced terms to vary across cross sectional units 
introducing some heterogeneity in the panel.  The LLC test, on the other hand, considers a homogeneous panel.  
Each of the tests is performed assuming an intercept and a linear trend. 
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of common shocks and unobserved components that ultimately become part of the error 
term.15This can be attributed-for example- to the experience of the increasing economic and 
financial integration across countries and financial entities, which implies strong 
interdependencies between the cross-sectional units. Taking the above into consideration, we 
implement a test of cross-sectional dependence in the panel structure of our data. We first use 
Pesaran’s (2004) CD test and we also run Frees (1995, 2004) test. Both tests are performed 
after estimating a fixed effects (FE) model. Pesaran’s CD test (15.7 and 16.9 for Models 1a and 
1b respectively, with p-values 0.000 in both cases) strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cross-sectional dependence for both specifications. Frees test (5.717 for Model 1a and 5.341 
for Model 1b) also rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence at 1% level.  
We next consider the issues of the existence of long-run relationships in our data. In 
order to do so we need to establish whether cointegration is present among the variables. Table 
2 reports the panel cointegration tests of Kao (1999), Pedroni (1999) and the Johansen-Fisher 
test (Maddala and Wu, 1999). The Pedroni test refers to the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
with alternative hypotheses allowing for heterogeneity among countries. The first four of the 
Pedroni tests are within-group statistics and compute the unit root tests of the residuals pooling 
the autoregressive coefficients across countries. The between-group statistics compute the tests 
by allowing the first-order autoregressive term to vary across countries and then averaging 
individual estimates across countries. With the exception of the v-statistic, panel and group 
statistics reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for both specifications. Similar results 
are produced from Kao 16 and Johansen-Fisher tests. The persistence in rejecting the null 
hypothesis suggests the existence of a homogeneous relationship that is in line with the use of 
the PMG estimator. A similar result is also indicated from the Kao test, which assumes panel 
homogeneity. Consequently, there is strong evidence that TFP, CAPB and control variables 
across the 26 countries in both specifications are cointegrated and two long-run homogeneous 
relationships could possibly be derived.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15See, for example, Pesaran (2004). 
16  The Kao test imposes homogeneity on cointegrating vectors. It is essentially a generalization of the DF 
(Dickey-Fuller) and the ADF (Augmented Dickey Fuller) tests. 
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Table 2: Panel Cointegration Tests 
Pedroni Tests Model 1 Model 2 
Ho:There is no 
cointegration  
  
H1:Common AR 
coefficients 
  
Panel v -0.743 -1.425 
Panel ρ 1.216 1.967* 
Panel PP -4.039** -3.286** 
Panel ADF -4.144** -2.646** 
H1:Idividual AR 
coefficients 
  
Group ρ 3.339** 3.798** 
Group PP -7.592** -6.989** 
Group ADF -5.049** -3.243** 
Kao ADF -2.228 
(0.013) 
-2.666 
(0.003) 
Johansen Fisher 
test 
From Trace Test 
From max Eigen 
test 
From Trace Test From max Eigen test 
Ho:No cointegrating 
vector  
303.3 
0.000) 
209.8 
(0.000) 
315.4 
(0.000) 
235.4 
(0.000) 
H1:At most 1 
cointegrating vector 
192.3 
(0.000) 
896.6 
(0.000) 
183.5 
(0.000) 
902.6 
(0.000) 
H1:At most 2 
cointegrating vectors 
102.8 
(0.000) 
102.2 
(0.000) 
93.09 
(0.000) 
94.21 
(0.000) 
H1:At most 3 
cointegrating vectors 
31.64 
(0.947) 
32.22 
(0.938) 
29.73 
(0.969) 
26.71 
(0.989) 
Notes: * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 5 and 1 percent based on the 1.644 
and 2.326 critical values, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are p-values. The Kao and Pedroni tests follow the 
normal distribution, while probabilities in the Johansen Fisher test are computed following asymptotically the chi-
squared distribution.   
 
 
 
3.3.3 Panel cointegration estimation 
To provide a sense of robustness, we present results from specification (2) using three different 
estimators, PMG, DOLS and CCE.17 We have more trust in the CCE estimator as it is the one 
that corrects for cross-sectional dependence in the panel structure of the data, thus we treat 
CCE as the preferred specification. The two CAPB definitions, CAPBO and CAPBE (Models 
1a and 1b, respectively) are used interchangeably as a check that results are robust to the 
methodology used to calculate the fiscal adjustment variable.  
Table 3 presents the long-run coefficients along with the error-correction coefficient 
from the PMG estimator. Our results highlight a strong long-run relationship between TFP and 
fiscal balance for OECD countries that are uniform and comparable across methods and 
specifications. Fiscal tightening has a negative and significant effect on TFP with the 
                                                 
17 The use of the CCE estimator is considered important since the performed CD tests indicate the existence of 
cross-sectional dependence. 
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magnitude of the relevant coefficient being larger when the OECD Economic Outlook 
definition of CAPBE is used. Among the three estimators CCE produces the largest coefficient 
for CAPB. Interestingly, accounting for cross-sectional dependence strengthens the claim of a 
negative TFP–CAPB relationship. In addition, the CCE estimator exhibits improved 
performance in terms of standard errors relative to PMG and DOLS estimators. Regarding the 
rest of the variables, openness has the strongest impact on TFP with the size of this coefficient 
in DOLS and PMG to be twice or three times as much the size in the CCE estimator. The 
remaining coefficients are statistically significant with the expected signs. Our findings support 
the argument that fiscal consolidation has detrimental effects in long-run productivity. The 
magnitude of the long-run CAPB coefficient varies between -0.046 and -0.01 (i.e. 0.021 on 
average) across the six different specifications shown in Table 3. Taking the highest value 
among the six, our estimates suggest that a 10% fiscal tightening leads to a 0.46% decrease in 
long-run productivity. It should be noted that the negative impact of this effect is smaller from 
the gain that R&D and trade openness generate.  
In the dynamic specification of the PMG estimator, the short-run error correction 
coefficient is negative and significant indicating a relatively fast adjustment to equilibrium. In 
a year about 40% has reverted back to the long-run cointegrating relationship, while full 
equilibrium is attained in almost two years. Error correction is an important feature of the TFP-
CAPB relationship expressed uniformly across the 26 countries of the sample. 
The main conclusion from the estimates in Table 3 is the sufficient evidence of a 
negative long-run relationship between discretionary fiscal policy, and TFP. This finding raises 
an issue that overlooked in the current literature of expansionary austerity; that is 
contractionary fiscal policy hurts productivity in a more lasting fashion. Our findings could be 
proved useful in several contexts, as for instance, it could help explain recent evidence 
contrasting the post- 2007/8 crisis adjustment in the Eurozone and the US. The slump in real 
activity in the post-2009 period was markedly more protracted in the Eurozone and this, 
according to Kollmann et al. (2016) reflects largely negative shocks to TFP growth, which 
were not so severe in the US. Our results would provide direct support to this view and in fact 
attribute the lower productivity growth in the euro area, among other factors, to differentials in 
fiscal policy, as between 2009 and 2016 the CAPB stood on average at 0.2% of potential GDP 
in the euro area, compared to -3.7% in the US.18 As already discussed in Section 2, austerity is 
more likely to impede productivity through the supply side of the economy, namely by limiting 
                                                 
18 US has adopted a much more loose fiscal policy in the post crisis period while EU has adopted in 
general a very tight fiscal budget. 
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public spending on sectors like public infrastructure, education and investment in new 
technologies. Empirically, verifying more precisely this mechanism is a promising avenue for 
future research and our study takes the first step towards this direction by further examining in 
the next section whether revenue-or expenditure-based fiscal consolidation is more damaging 
to the productive capacity of the economy. The expansionary austerity thesis argues in favor of 
spending-based consolidations, but the line of reasoning presented here would point to exactly 
the opposite conclusion. 
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Table 3: The Determinants of TFP, Long-Run estimates from PMG, DOLS and CCE  
 PMG 
(1) 
 DOLS 
(2) 
 CCE 
  (3) 
Model 1a      𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂        -0.007*** 
  (0.002) 
 -0.010*  
 (0.006) 
 -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
RDt       0.073***  
  (0.006) 
      0.021***  
 (0.324) 
 0.053*** 
(0.001) 
it      -0.006***  
  (0.000) 
      -0.019***           
  (0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
opennesst        0.911***  
  (0.123) 
       1.863***  
  (0.298) 
 0.431*** 
(0.038) 
gfci    -0.019*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.125** 
(0.07) 
 -0.274*** 
(0.016) 
Observations 697  745   745 
R2   0.12    0.97 
SE   1.386  0.859 
Log likelihood 1230     
F test 2.05*1013     
Model 1b       
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸  -0.015***  
       (0.003) 
 -0.045*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.046*** 
(0.001) 
RDt 0.076***  
       (0.005) 
 0.021*** 
(0.327) 
 0.050*** 
(0.001) 
it -0.011***  
       (0.001) 
 -0.017*** 
(0.003) 
 -0,008*** 
(0.001) 
opennesst     0.962***  
        (0.088) 
 1.381*** 
(0.188) 
 0.415*** 
(0.059) 
gfci -0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.09** 
(0.07) 
 -0.237*** 
(0.027) 
Observations 682  727  727 
R2   0.13  0.97 
SE    1.387  0.813 
Log likelihood 1215     
F test 5*1012     
Error Correction Coefficient   
Model 1a -0.409***  
        (0.075) 
    
Model 1b -0.396***  
        (0.064) 
    
Notes: The dependent variable in PMG is Δtfp and in DOLS and CCE is tfp. In PMG, estimates refer to long-run 
elasticities with respect to relevant regressors, short-run coefficients are not reported here but they are available 
from the authors upon request. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. gfc is a dummy variable that accounts 
for the effect of a global financial crisis. The variable takes value one in the year of crisis, which is country 
specific and zero otherwise (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011). The lag order in PMG is 2 for the dependent variable 
and 1 for each of the independent variables. Model selection was based on the Schwartz criterion. F-test refers to 
the null hypothesis that coefficients of all independent variables included are zero, standard errors are in 
parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
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3.4 Tax versus spending driven consolidation  
 
In this last section, we extend our analysis by decomposing fiscal consolidation into spending 
cuts and tax hikes. For this exercise, we use the data set of Devries et al. (2011) that reports 
policy actions for fiscal consolidation in 17 OECD countries over a shorter time span and 
smaller country coverage than those used so far for our previous estimates. We replicate the 
PMG and CCE estimates of Table 3 using spending cuts and tax hikes (both expressed as 
shares to GDP), separately. We first report in column (1) of Table 4 estimates from a total 
consolidation variable as reported in Devries et al. (2011). Columns (1) and (3) in Table 4 can 
be viewed as an additional robustness check of the estimates shown in Table 3, nonetheless 
these estimates are not directly comparable as the data sample is now smaller both in time 
dimension and cross-sectional coverage. The consolidation variable is insignificant when PMG 
is used, while it remains negative and statistically significant with CCE. More crucially, results 
in columns (2) and (4) indicate that tax hike driven consolidation has a positive effect on TFP, 
while the opposite is true for spending cuts. The size of estimated coefficients changes 
noticeably between PMG and CCE in Table 4, but more importantly the sign of the coefficients 
remains consistent between estimators. This pattern of results is rather intriguing as it points 
towards two crucial implications, first, the type of consolidation matters and second, arguments 
in favour of productivity enhancing austerity mainly work through taxation hikes. This is to 
say that any uncertainty associated with expansionary fiscal policy can be more effectively 
corrected with an increase in taxes rather than spending cuts.19 Our findings do not comply 
with the common wisdom that government spending is essentially unproductive (transfers and 
social benefits etc.); to the contrary, government consumption plays a central role in shaping 
national productive capacity in terms of fixed assets that are more likely complementary to 
private investment. The result that spending driven consolidation has a negative impact on TFP 
also suggests that government is in charge of sectors such as education, health and justice for 
which underfunding can have crucial negative consequences in the long-run. Castro also 
(2017) presents evidence in support of this claim based on evidence from 15 European Union 
countries during the period 1990-2012, concluding that during fiscal consolidation episodes 
governments significantly cut spending related to safety, health assistance, and investment in 
human capital. 
                                                 
19  For further evidence against expenditure-driven fiscal consolidation, see Kaplanoglou et al.(2015) for 
industrialised countries and Schaltegger and Weder (2015) for developing countries. In the case of tax hikes, there 
is evidence that certain kinds of taxes are themselves harmful for TFP. Bournakis and Mallick (2017, 2018), for 
example, show that corporate tax negatively affects TFP growth at a firm-level based on data from the UK.
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Table 4: The Determinants of TFP, Long-Run estimates from PMG and CCE.  
Historical Data of Fiscal Consolidation (Devries et al., 2011), 1980-2009, 17 OECD Countries 
 
 PMG 
(1) 
PMG 
(2) 
CCE 
(3) 
CCE 
(4) 
Main     
consolidation -0.045  -0.039**  
 (0.14)  (0.02)  
Tax  0.811**  0.441*** 
  (0.36)  (0.04) 
Spending  -1.133**  -0.251*** 
  (0.48)  (0.03) 
RD 2.512*** 3.235* 0.965*** 0.975*** 
 (0.93) (1.69) (0.09) (0.09) 
 i -0.061 -0.150 -0.023*** -0.026*** 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) 
Openness 2.682* 0.882 0.516*** 0.593*** 
 (1.38) (1.58) (0.20) (0.20) 
Observations 475 475 416 416 
R2   0.12 0.12 
Error Correction Coefficient  
 0.19 (0.085)* 0.12 (0.1)*   
Notes: The dependent variable in PMG is Δtfp and in CCE is tfp. In PMG, estimates refer to long-run elasticities 
with respect to relevant regressors, short-run coefficients are not reported here but they are available from the 
authors upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country with *, ** and *** indicating 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
 
4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The present paper evaluates the role of fiscal consolidation on productivity. The existing 
literature is mainly focused on the role of short-run effects without considering if austerity has 
long-run effects on economic activity through the supply side of the economy. The main goal 
of our paper is to shed light on this rather unexplored area of the expansionary austerity 
literature. Our empirical methodology is split into two parts, first, we run a PVAR model to 
identify the short-run effects of fiscal consolidation episodes on TFP growth and second, we 
employ panel cointegration as well as other estimation techniques to establish the long-run 
relationship between fiscal consolidation and TFP. We found that the negative impact of a 
fiscal consolidation episode lasts for about two years and it is disproportionately more 
damaging in low debt countries, where probably issues of debt sustainability are not so severe 
thus, contractionary fiscal action causes adverse effects in productivity. This result holds even 
if we use labour productivity instead of TFP. Using three different estimators (PMG, DOLS 
and CCE), we also establish a negative long-run relationship between TFP and fiscal 
adjustments. The size of this effect is smaller relative to other traditional TFP drivers but not 
negligible in statistical terms. Our findings thus, highlight yet another channel through which 
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austerity impairs long-run growth prospects, namely via its detrimental effect in decelerating 
aggregate productivity.  
This has serious policy implications not only with regard to the validity of the 
expansionary fiscal contraction thesis, but also in the context of the debt-sustainability debate, 
where austerity can prove self-defeating. On a more general front, our findings could also 
contribute to the currently heated debate on better understanding hysteresis mechanisms, or 
what Stiglitz (2015) called the missing “dark matter”, following economic crises like the 
global recent one which affect economies’ productive capacity (Ball, 2014). Having 
established contractionary fiscal policy as a one of the long-run determinants of such capacity, 
highlights an additional cost of austerity and calls for a more in-depth analysis of its design on 
the policy front.  
Our results also cast doubt on the claim regarding the superiority of spending-based 
fiscal consolidations, which has been central in the policy debate when austerity programmes 
are designed worldwide. Distinguishing between taxes and expenditure, we reveal that tax 
based austerity is more appropriate for TFP while spending driven fiscal consolidation 
undermines capacity, due to the important role of government in financing investments related 
to the productive capital of the economy. Public expenditure on infrastructure projects, 
technology, innovation, education and health builds the necessary physical, human and social 
capital that enhances the productive capacity of the economy and such expenditure often bears 
a large share of the burden of fiscal consolidation.  
Some caveats are in order regarding our analysis, while there are further interesting 
dimensions worth exploring to expand our understanding of this rich research topic. First we 
need a more thorough classification of what really represents productive government spending. 
This requires the construction of a CAPB measure that will explicitly distinguish between 
productive and non-productive government spending. Additionally, our analysis does not 
investigate whether non-linearities and asymmetries are present in the sample. Although we 
have split our sample into low and high debt countries, it remains of interest to explore 
whether the TFP-fiscal consolidation nexus changes above or below critical thresholds of 
austerity. Within a panel of heterogeneous countries, it will be also of relevance to identify 
country specific thresholds in the TFP austerity nexus. Finally, it would also be worth to 
explore the effect of austerity on different components of gross fixed capital formation, 
especially investment in intangible assets which has been steadily growing over time (Van Ark 
et al., 2008). All these matters call for further research on the topic.   
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Appendices 
 
A1. TFP Measurement  
 
We consider the following aggregate production function with parameter A to represent Hicks 
neutral technical change: 
 1L La a
it it it itY A L K
−=   (A1) 
Y is value added, L is labour and K is capital stock; i and t index country and year, respectively. 
The share of labour to value added is denoted by 1La < . Labour input is measured in hours 
worked per employee in the total economy (OECD, Economic Outlook) and capital stock is 
constructed with the perpetual inventory method as follows: 1 1 1it it it itK K K Iδ− − −= − + , where 
δ is the physical depreciation rate defined at a constant rate of 10% for all countries. I is 
investment in Gross Fixed Capital Formation (OECD, Economic Outlook). We initiate the 
series of capital stock from the following steady state condition: 00
it
it
i
I
K
g δ
=
= ≡ + , where g is the 
sample mean of investment growth rate for each country. Value added and investment are 
deflated using GDP and GFCF deflators (2010=100) (OECD, Economic Outlook). Labour 
share is the ratio of real wages to real GDP. Wages are deflated using the consumer price index 
(CPI). To make values comparable across countries, we express all data into PPP constant USD 
(2010=100). To measure TFP, the empirical counterpart of A, we use the Tornqvist index 
number (Caves et al., 1982; Good et al., 1996), which is superlative as its components can be 
derived from an underlying translog production function. Accordingly, output and input units 
in each country are expressed relative to a hypothetical reference point. After taking logs of 
(A1) and re-arranging we get:   
 ( ) ( ) ( )log log log log (1 ) log logL Lit it it it it itTFP Y Y a L L a K K= − − − − − −     (A2) 
The hypothetical points for Y, L and K are denoted with a bar and defined as sample geometric 
means of each variable. Analogously, we express the adjusted labor shares as: 
2
it
it
a a
a
+=  
with the waved bar above a  to represent the sample arithmetic mean. We also experiment by 
measuring TFP using data from Penn World Table (9.1) (PWT). This data source allows 
adjusting labour input for human capital, so the labour input is the defined as: HLL =~ , with H 
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denoting the average human capital index in the economy. The degree of correlation in the TFP 
series constructed from Economic Outlook (EO) and PWT (adjusted for labour quality) is 0.86.  
Appendix A2 shows the sample means of TFP from each source. Two points merit highlighting 
from Appendix A2, the ranking of countries based on TFP does not change substantially 
between the two data sources and second TFP_PWT tends to be downward biased more likely 
reflecting the fact that accounting for human capital reduces the source of technological 
progress that is unexplained as it is now attributed to the quality of labour.  
 
 
Appendix A2: Total Factor Productivity Means, 1980-2016 
TFP_EO TFP_PWT 
United States 6.931 United States 4.540 
Japan 4.426 United Kingdom 2.549 
Germany 3.186 Germany 2.310 
France 2.649 France 2.037 
Italy 2.275 Switzerland 1.979 
United Kingdom 2.032 Japan 1.646 
Spain 1.784 Netherlands 1.557 
Canada 1.644 Canada 1.456 
Poland 1.225 Australia 1.453 
Netherlands 1.149 Spain 1.425 
Australia 1.114 Italy 1.422 
Switzerland 0.947 Sweden 1.160 
Korea 0.871 Belgium 1.124 
Norway 0.844 Denmark 1.085 
Belgium 0.808 Norway 0.998 
Sweden 0.807 Ireland 0.965 
Austria 0.671 Austria 0.961 
Portugal 0.666 Poland 0.863 
Denmark 0.641 New Zealand 0.805 
Greece 0.614 Korea 0.743 
Hungary 0.516 Czech Republic 0.689 
Czech Republic 0.472 Portugal 0.688 
Finland 0.460 Finland 0.678 
New Zealand 0.428 Greece 0.534 
Ireland 0.412 Hungary 0.197 
Iceland 0.063 Iceland 0.018 
Notes: TFP_EO is the TFP series constructed from Economic outlook-OECD (2018); TFP_PWT is TFP series 
constructed from Penn World Tables (9.1). The TFP_PWT is adjusted for labour quality as per explanation in 
Appendix A1.  
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B1. Panel Var (PVAR) Specification 
 
 
The specific PVAR model used to derive the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) is the 
following:  
1 2
H H
it i t h it h t h it h it
t h t h
tfp tfp FCγ β β υ− − − −
− −
∆ = + ∆ + +∑ ∑  with h≥1 
 
Parameter iγ controls for country heterogeneity and h  specifies the number of lags. The 
optimal number of lags is chosen from the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) reported in the 
table below.  
 
Lag Selection for PVAR 
Numbers of lags BIC 
 FCE1 
1 -25.48344 
2 -67.34058 
3 -43.86729 
4 -5.628352 
 FCE2 
1 -31.84603 
2 -65.15207 
3 -52.55787 
4 -11.52538 
 FCE3 
1 -31.7996 
2 -70.48421 
3 -55.57539 
4 -12.65899 
Notes: BIC Bayesian Information criteria for a PVAR(2) with h initially specified from 1-4. Minimum BIC in 
each model is specified in bold.  
 
 
B2: Results from Panel Granger Causality Tests  
Hypothesis Z statistic Critical value Outcome 
TFP does not cause 
CAPBO 
2.619/p-value=0.10 3.304 reject 
TFP does not cause 
CAPBE 
0.408/p-value=0.82 4.501 Reject 
Notes: The p-values are computed from 1000 bootstrap replications. The optimal lag is 1 as indicated by the 
BIC criterion. 
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B3: Average Values of Debt-to-GDP ratio, 1980-2016, Sample Median: 57% 
Country Mean Group 
Australia 26.54 Low 
Austria 63.74 High  
Belgium 109.74 High 
Canada 75.71 High 
Czech Republic 28.17 Low 
Denmark 54.82 Low 
Finland 37.15 Low 
France 56.53 Low 
Germany 62.79 High 
Greece 98.02 High 
Hungary 68.24 High 
Iceland 56.11 Low 
Ireland 73.05 High 
Italy 100.76 High  
Japan 135.25 High 
Korea 25.77 Low 
Netherlands 61.36 High 
New Zealand 27.15 Low 
Norway 36.73 Low 
Poland 46.47 Low 
Portugal 67.68 High 
Spain 52.98 Low 
Sweden 50.59 Low 
Switzerland  48.14 Low 
United Kingdom 49.45 Low 
United States 68.59 High 
 
60.82  
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C.  DOLS specification 
DOLS takes account of the endogeneity bias that is inherent in static OLS by 
augmenting specification (1) with leads, lags and contemporaneous values of all regressors. 
DOLS estimates the following version of (1): 
2 2
1 1
1 1
j p j p
it it it ij it j ij it j it
j p j p
tfp α c c u
= =
− − + +
=− =−
′= + + + +∑ ∑xx α x     (C1) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the coefficient of a lag or a lead of the first differences of the variables.  
 
D. Definition of CAPB and Descriptive Statistics 
Two alternative definitions of cyclical adjustment of government budget balances that 
determine fiscal consolidation have been used in the estimation of the relationship between 
TFP and fiscal consolidation. The first, CAPBE is obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook 
No 102 of November 2017 and it is given as a percentage of potential GDP. Data from 
Economic Outlook of previous years were used to obtain a continuous series. The OECD uses 
a disaggregated approach with respect to the calculation of the CAPB where it first adjusts 
individual tax and spending categories for the cycle, and then aggregates the resulting 
cyclically adjusted items into a CAPB (for details, see OECD, 2018). 
The second definition of cyclically adjusted government balances namely CAPBO is 
derived from own calculations and it is based on the European Commission’s method using 
trend GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott filter. The method involves two main steps. In the first 
step, the output trend is estimated by means of the Hodrick-Prescott filter and the output gap 
between the trend GDP level and the actual output is calculated. In the second step, cyclical 
components of budget balances are calculated by applying the output gaps to the marginal rates 
of change of revenue and expenditure with respect to GDP. More specifically, the cyclical 
component of the primary balance is obtained by multiplying the output gap with the 
budgetary sensitivity to GDP (European Commission, 2017). Budgetary elasticities have been 
calculated by OECD in “Measuring cyclically adjusted budget balances for OECD countries” 
by Nathalie Girouard and Christophe Andre in OECD Economics Department Working Paper 
No 434, 2005.20 Finally, the cyclically adjusted budget balances are obtained by deducting the 
cyclical component from the actual government budget balances.     
 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that in our calculations we have used the elasticities for the Total Balance choosing not to 
break down in revenue and expenditure. 
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D1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
Variables in levels 
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max 
tfpt 1.44 0.85 1.49 0.06 6.93 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 -0.15 0.10 3.12 -26.12 14.48 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂 -0.20 -0.00 4.14 -31.10 14.85 
RDt 7.72 7.19 4.99 0.24 21.73 
it 6.82 5.61 4.17 -0.07 29.74 
opennesst -0.00 -0.01 0.09 -0.44 0.39 
 
Panel B 
Variables in first differences 
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max 
Δtfpt-1 -0.00 -0.00 0.09 -0.44 0.68 𝛥𝛥𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸 0.09 0.08 2.04 -18.33 18.05 Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂 0.16 0.07 2.55 -17.80 19.69 ΔRDt 0.16 0.11 0.28 -1.14 2.58 
Δit -0.37 -0.29 1.20 -12.45 6.75 
Δopennesst 0.00 -0.00 0.03 -0.16 0.17 
Notes: We present descriptive statistics for an unbalanced sample of 936 observations. Panel A shows averages 
for the level variables, while panel B presents descriptive statistics of first difference transformations of the same 
variables.  
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D2: Consolidation Episodes per Country According to Criterion FCE3  
Country Years of Fiscal consolidation Episodes 
Australia 1986, 1987, 2011, 2013 
Austria 1984, 1986, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2015 
Belgium 1993, 2006 
Canada 1986, 1987, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2012 
Czech Republic 1999, 2004, 2013, 2016 
Denmark 1983, 1984, 1986, 2005, 2013, 2014 
Finland 1981, 1984, 1988, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 
France 1996 
Germany 1992, 1996, 2000, 2011 
Greece 2005. 2010, 2011, 2012,2014, 2016 
Hungary 1996, 1999,2003,2007,2008, 2009, 2012 
Iceland 1984, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2005, 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016 
Ireland 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, 2003, 2011, 2012, 
2013 
Italy 1982, 1983, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 2007, 
2012 
Japan 1984. 1985, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2014, 
2015 
Korea 2000, 2004, 2010 
Netherlands 1983, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2013, 2016 
New Zealand 1987, 1989, 1991, 2000, 2011, 2012 
Norway 1983, 1995 
Poland 2011, 2012 
Portugal 1983, 1984, 1988, 1992, 2002, 2006, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2015 
Spain 1992, 1996, 2010, 2012, 2013 
Sweden 1983, 1986, 1987, 1996, 2010 
Switzerland  
UK 1982, 1998, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2016 
US 2011, 2013 
 Note: FCE3 takes the value one if country i has achieved a dcapb >1.5 in year t and zero otherwise. 
